Q1 2026 Market Outlook – Quarterly Investment Review

The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. – Henry Kissinger

Stock markets’ strong performance in 2025 continued into the first two months of this year, despite an increasingly disturbing geopolitical backdrop. This Q1 2026 market outlook examines how quickly sentiment shifted as geopolitical tensions escalated and began to materially impact global markets.

On January 3rd, US special forces captured President Maduro of Venezuela and brought him to face trial in New York on charges of narco-terrorism. As the quarter progressed, President Trump sought to annex Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, and rhetorically suggested that the US could annex Canada, while also announcing his intention to ‘take Cuba’. While these developments contributed to a growing sense of instability, they were ultimately overshadowed by the US/Israeli attack on Iran on the last day of February.

Iran’s response was decisive. By effectively closing the Straits of Hormuz—through which around 20% of the world’s energy supply transits—the country triggered the largest global energy disruption since the Second World War. Oil prices surged by 68% in March alone, reshaping expectations for growth and inflation alike.

This sudden escalation exposed fractures within the NATO alliance and raised broader questions about the role of the United States as a stabilising global force. Markets, which had largely ignored geopolitical noise at the start of the year, rapidly repriced. By the end of the quarter, the MSCI World Index had declined by 3.4%, while US 10-year Treasury bonds were marginally lower.

A fragile and highly binary environment

The current situation remains fluid, uncertain and increasingly binary. Despite overwhelming conventional military superiority, the US has struggled to secure safe passage through the Straits of Hormuz. The threat posed by low-cost, asymmetric tactics—drones, naval mines and fast-moving explosive vessels—has proven highly effective.

Oil tankers, by nature slow and vulnerable, are particularly exposed. Even naval forces have had to retreat at times to avoid concentrated drone attacks. While limited shipments continue under Iranian oversight, the broader disruption remains unresolved.

The economic implications are significant. The longer the situation persists, the greater the strain on global supply chains. Inflationary pressures are already emerging as delays, shortages and logistical bottlenecks feed through to prices. Compounding this, damage to regional energy infrastructure may take years to repair, suggesting that the effects of this shock could extend well beyond the immediate crisis.

Beyond oil: a systemic supply shock

While oil dominates headlines, the real impact is more complex and far-reaching. Refined products such as diesel, jet fuel and naphtha are essential inputs across multiple industries. The disruption therefore affects not just energy markets, but the broader functioning of the global economy.

The region hosts 68 oil refineries, strategically located to benefit from low-cost energy. These facilities produce a wide range of materials that underpin industrial activity—from transportation fuels to petrochemicals used in plastics.

Energy remains deeply embedded in modern economic systems. Oil and gas are not only central to transport, but also to electricity generation, fertiliser production and manufacturing processes.

For instance, Taiwan relies on liquefied natural gas (LNG) for roughly 40% of its electricity generation, with a significant portion sourced from Qatar. LNG is difficult to store at scale. Any disruption risks forcing rationing, particularly for industrial users. This would have immediate consequences for semiconductor production—an essential component of the global technology ecosystem and AI supply chain.

The Middle East also supplies a substantial share of the world’s helium, critical for both semiconductor manufacturing and aerospace applications. In addition, it is a key source of sulphuric acid, required for processing metals such as copper, nickel and uranium—materials central to electrification and the energy transition.

Another critical vulnerability lies in agriculture. Approximately one-third of global fertiliser shipments pass through the Straits of Hormuz. The timing of the disruption—coinciding with the spring planting season in the Northern Hemisphere—raises the likelihood of food price inflation in the months ahead.

Macroeconomic transmission channels

The economic impact of higher energy prices is well understood, but no less significant. First, rising costs reduce consumers’ disposable income, leaving less available for discretionary spending. Second, heightened uncertainty leads households and businesses to delay major purchases.

Third, concerns about employment prospects tend to increase precautionary savings, further dampening demand. Finally, if inflation accelerates, central banks may be forced to tighten monetary policy, increasing borrowing costs and slowing economic activity.

What makes the current situation particularly challenging is the lack of short-term alternatives. Energy systems are not easily adaptable. Vehicles, industrial processes and heating systems cannot quickly shift away from fossil fuels, reinforcing the persistence of the shock.

Historically, oil price spikes of this magnitude have often preceded economic slowdowns or recessions. While today’s global economy is less energy-intensive than in the 1970s, the scale and breadth of the current disruption remain concerning.

Financial markets: vulnerabilities beneath the surface

This shock comes at a time when several areas of the financial system already appear stretched. Technology companies—particularly hyperscalers—are investing heavily in infrastructure, with capital expenditure expected to reach $600 billion this year, largely driven by AI development.

At the same time, parts of the private credit market are showing signs of strain. These segments, often less transparent, may be particularly sensitive to tightening financial conditions. In parallel, an estimated $3.8 trillion of private equity assets remain unsold, awaiting favourable exit conditions.

Higher energy prices and increased volatility could place additional pressure on this ecosystem, raising the risk of forced adjustments or delayed liquidity events.

Another important consideration is the role of energy-exporting nations in global capital flows. Historically, Gulf states have recycled oil revenues into international financial markets, notably US government bonds and equities. Any disruption to these flows—whether due to reduced production or increased domestic spending needs—could remove a key source of liquidity.

This comes at a time when public finances in many developed economies are already under strain. US government debt has reached $36 trillion and continues to rise rapidly. In the UK, welfare expenditure now exceeds income tax revenues. These constraints limit policymakers’ ability to respond aggressively to future shocks.

A path to de-escalation?

Despite the severity of the situation, there are reasons to believe that a resolution remains possible. Both the United States and Iran face strong incentives to avoid a prolonged conflict.

In the US, the upcoming mid-term elections represent a significant political constraint. A deterioration in economic conditions could weaken the administration’s position, particularly given the narrow balance of power in Congress.

Iran, meanwhile, is grappling with acute economic stress. Hyperinflation and currency collapse have created conditions that historically increase the risk of domestic instability. These pressures may encourage a negotiated outcome.

Should a resolution be reached and the Straits of Hormuz reopen, energy markets could stabilise relatively quickly. Oil prices, currently elevated, could fall materially, alleviating pressure on both inflation and growth.

Recovery scenario and structural drivers

In such a scenario, the broader economic backdrop could reassert itself. Fiscal stimulus in major economies—including the United States, Germany and Japan—remains supportive. At the same time, China continues to benefit from strong export dynamics.

Longer-term structural trends also remain intact. The expansion of data centres to support artificial intelligence, alongside the need to modernise electricity grids, is driving sustained demand for commodities and infrastructure investment.

Recent events may even reinforce these trends. The disruption has highlighted the strategic importance of secure and diversified supply chains, particularly for critical materials. As a result, governments and companies may increase investment in resilience, including stockpiling and domestic production capacity.

Conclusion: navigating uncertainty

Markets have entered a phase where outcomes are increasingly dependent on geopolitical developments. The range of potential scenarios remains wide, from prolonged disruption and economic slowdown to a relatively rapid normalisation.

The longer the current impasse persists, the greater the risk of compounding effects across supply chains, inflation and financial markets. However, political and economic incentives on both sides suggest that de-escalation is a realistic possibility.

In parallel, policymakers—particularly central banks—may respond to deteriorating conditions with supportive measures, especially in politically sensitive periods.

For investors, this environment calls for caution and discipline. Diversification, resilience and a focus on underlying fundamentals remain essential. While uncertainty is likely to persist in the near term, periods of dislocation can also create opportunities for those positioned to navigate them effectively.

Written by James Macpherson

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Quarterly Investment Review – Q4 2025

We’re seeing substantial asset inflation away from the dollar as people are looking for ways to effectively de-dollarise, or de-risk their portfolios vis-a-vis US sovereign risk.
Ken Griffin

‘‘The multiples of technology stocks should be quite a bit lower than the multiples of stocks like Coke and Gillette because we are subject to complete changes in the rules’’ Bill Gates in 1998

‘‘I’m willing to go bankrupt rather than lose this race’’
Larry Page, co-founder of Google

2025 was a gangbuster year for financial markets. Most equity markets delivered double digit gains, and most bond markets also generated positive returns. Apart from oil and the grains market, commodity markets were strong, and precious metals enjoyed spectacular returns. For once the US market was not the best performer. After a decade and a half of dominating equity returns the US produced one of the weaker performances, and if the currency is taken into consideration that result was even further behind, as the US dollar fell approximately 10% during the year. Elsewhere strong results were widespread across European, Asia and the Emerging Markets. The MSCI World Index was up 19.5% in US dollars or 16.9% measured in Local Currencies, and the S&P500 was up 16.4%.

Given the political background in 2025 this result might seem surprising. President Trump initiated a trade war by imposing tariffs which bludgeoned the world trade system. In Europe, the UK and France endured rolling political difficulties centred on both countries inability to contain their debt problems. The Ukraine war continues, while the Gaza war has reached an uneasy truce. What accounted for the market’s rise was good earnings growth in the US, while in Europe it was due more to a rerating. Underpinning all markets was an exceptionally supportive liquidity environment. Fiscal policies in all the major economies were benign – the US, China, Japan and most EU countries ran deficits of about 5% of GDP; low interest rates prevailed across the world; the US dollar weakened, which was particularly helpful for those Emerging Markets whose currencies were pegged to the dollar; and oil prices declined by close to 20% in US dollars and even more in other currencies, which has the effect of a giant tax cut for the world’s consumers. 2025 thus represented a rare occasion when the global economy, even though it wasn’t in recession, was stimulated by every lever at Governments’ disposal. This stimulus looks set to continue into 2026 as Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill kicks in during January, as well as a promise of more deregulation. Germany’s giant fiscal boost will also get underway, and OPEC have increased their production to keep energy prices subdued. Given the midterm elections in the US in November President Trump will do everything he can to juice the economy in the run up to that.

Such stimulus could trigger inflation, and the biggest danger to stock markets would be a selloff in the bond markets, particularly the long end, on fears that the incontinent profligacy of government spending is unsustainable. While bond markets were stable in 2025, they have been poor investments in the last decade due to mounting concerns about Western debt profiles. According to Gavekal, since July 2020 the real return on a constant 10-year duration US Treasury bond has been minus 33%, and minus 37% for a German bund. Many Western countries debt to GDP ratios have risen above 100% and have annual deficits of 5–7% The interest cost on Government debt, for example, now exceed £110bn in the UK and $1 trillion in the US. As these debts spiral ever higher bond investors are being presented with the equivalent of investing in a share that yields 4% while it is annually increasing its share count by 7%. It was a striking feature of 2025 to see the complete failure of governments’ attempts to rein in these deficits. Trump campaigned a year ago on a promise to slash government spending, but Elon Musk’s DOGE effort collapsed in three months. The UK and France failed to remove even minor items of welfare spending from their budgets. It appears to be impossible to control the excesses in the public sector in these countries. In this context the change of Federal Reserve Chairmanship when Jerome Powell retires in May may be one of the most significant in history. The new Chairman will be chosen by President Trump on the basis that they will be expected to set rates significantly below current levels. Coming at a time when inflation is above target, deficits are at record levels, and global confidence in US policy is fragile, investors will have to grapple with how markets react to this new regime at the Fed. Meanwhile Governments will continue to overspend. The likelihood is that this spending will only be controlled when there is a failed bond auction which will force them to economise.

The US equity market’s superior returns have overwhelmingly stemmed from the extraordinary performance of its technology sector and particularly the largest companies, commonly referred to as the Mag 7. Since November 2022 when ChatGPT was released the US stock market has added $30 trillion in market capitalisation as the profits promised by AI (Artificial Intelligence) have come to obsess investors. As a result, the largest stock, Nvidia, has a larger weighting in the MSCI World Index than the entire Japanese market. In order not to fall behind in the AI race the leading companies are spending gigantic sums. Forecasts estimate that they will spend $566 billion in 2026, following $441 billion in 2025. Projections for the next several years suggest it will continue at these levels. Unlike the internet boom which rewarded successful operators for minimal capital investment, the AI build out is capital intensive and the returns uncertain. The datacentres that are at the heart of AI are subject to rapid obsolescence, with their useful economic life estimated at less than eight years. The relentless innovation in the sector could mean that whatever is cutting edge today is overtaken in the next few years leading to costly updates and overhauls, making it even more challenging to earn a satisfactory return on today’s investment. When money is allocated so fast in what remains a speculative industry the risks become much higher. There is little doubt that AI will be a transformational technology, but as with the railways and the internet much of the early capital invested may come to grief. The concern is that because the Mag 7 have been so entwined with the rise in the market if they fail to execute a satisfactory return on their enormous investments this failure will undermine the market. Their health has become the health of the entire market. Equally concerning is if this investment does justify itself then where will this profit come from? The most likely source is that it will derive from companies shedding labour. This uncertainty on how AI will be deployed into the economy means that firms have already reduced hiring, particularly of graduates. PwC have reduced graduate hirings by 35-40% for example. As firms work out how to use it, this jobs freeze may morph into firings. Historically when technology has made people redundant, they have found new jobs, but the speed of change this time may be quicker making the transition harder. Eventually the impact will be on the older generation who have less transferrable skills and the effect of this could be cataclysmic. This is likely to become an increasing political problem.

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